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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OBSCENITY-NEW
FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARDS

Miller v. California,93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
T HAS BEEN OVER fifteen years since the Supreme Court embarked on
its precarious course of determining the Constitutional boundaries for
control of obscenity by the state and federal governments. The Court's
first attempt to define the meaning of obscenity and ultimately determine
the Constitutional protection afforded this expression was in Roth v.
United States.1 What has followed can only be characterized as a series
of irreconcilable conflicts and discrepancies that have left the law in this
area in total confusion.2 Recently, the Court in Miller v. California3 has
again attempted to provide "concrete guidelines to isolate 'hard core'
4
pornography from expressions protected by the first amendment."
Unfortunately, this optimism may be premature when this decision
is examined in light of past experience.
The appellant Marvin Miller conducted a mass mailing campaign to
advertise the sale of illustrated material. He was convicted under
California Penal Code Section 311.25 for sending in the mail unsolicited
brochures advertising four books and a film. These brochures consisted
primarily of pictures and drawings explicitly depicting men and women in
groups of two or more engaging in a variety of sexual activities with
genitals often prominently displayed. 6 The Supreme Court rejected the
guidelines used by the State of California to distinguish obscenity
from protected speech and on remand, directed the lower court to
apply a new test for obscenity designed to effect prosecution for
materials which depict "hard core" sexual conduct. 7
From the facts presented, the Supreme Court could have decided
the case on the basis of upholding the state's interest in protecting the
sensibilities of unconsenting adults or exposure to juveniles. 8 This interest

1 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
2 United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155 n. 2 (2d Cir. 1965), contains a chronology of

the Supreme Court's obscenity and censorship rulings from 1957 to 1966. For a
discussion of more recent cases see Licker, The Constitutionalityof FederalObscenity
Legislation: Roth and Stanley on a Seesaw, 52 BOSTON UNIV. L. REv. 443 (1972).
3 Miller v. California, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973).
4 Id. at 2617.
5CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2(a) (West 1970).
6
Miller v. California, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2611-12 (1973).
7ld. at 2615-22.
8 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969); Ginzberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
637-43 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968); Redrup
v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964).
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has consistently been found to be a legitimate concern of the state even
among those justices who now call for a new approach to the problem
of obscenity. 9 However, the majority of the Court uses this opportunity to
attempt to redefine standards which can be used to distinguish obscenity
from constitutionally protected expression. These new standards are
0
purported by the Court to be more concrete than those in the past.'
Before discussing the particular rationale of the Miller decision, it is
important to examine briefly the historical context in which this recent
decision must be interpreted. In Roth the Court first developed what has
now been termed the two-level approach to obscenity.'" Upholding the2
constitutionality of section 1461 of the federal obscenity statute,1
the Court states that obscenity is not protected by the first amendment.
In support of this conclusion historical precedent was cited to show
that the unconditional phrasing of the first amendment was not
intended to protect all types of expression and that obscenity was
3
The Court proceeded to
consistently excluded from its protection.
distinguish obscenity from protected speech4 as being a form of expression
"utterly without redeeming social value."'
The difficult task, however, is not describing obscenity in the abstract
and distinguishing it from protected speech, but rather the development
of a functional standard to be used by legislatures and eventually the
courts. In Roth a majority of only five justices agreed that obscenity
could be determined by asking "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of material
15
The four remaining
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests."
16
justices developed their own approach to the obscenity problem.

9 Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2659 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10 Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2612 (1973).
11 Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 10-11.
12 The test of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1966) is quoted by the Court in 402 U.S. at 352 n. 1.
13 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 n. 9. The Court specifically rejects the
past practice of allowing the obscene character of a book to be judged by the effect
of isolated excerpts upon particularly susceptible persons, see, e.g., The Queen v.
Hicklin [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360.
14 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
15 Id. at 489.
16 Justice Black and Justice Douglas consistently maintained that government is wholly
powerless to regulate any sexually oriented matter on the ground of its obscenity,
see, e.g., Ginzberg v. United States 383 U.S. 463, 476-82 (1966) (dissenting opinion);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (concurring opinion); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957) (dissenting opinion). Justice Harlan, however, feels
that the Federal Government may control hard-core pornography while the states may
ban any material that treats sex in a fundamentally offensive manner, Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 204 (1964) (dissenting opinion). Justice Stewart regarded
hard-core pornography as the limit of both federal and state power, see, e.g.,
Ginzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1966) (concurring opinion).
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However, even the majority in Roth failed to remain in agreement
when forced to app!y their test to material presented for review. The
Court continually demonstrated the need to refine the definition of
17
what is obscene and make it more precise. In Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
Justice Brennan developed a new standard in an effort to clarify his
decision in Roth. This test which has gained the most popularity in
recent years consists of three parts:
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to prurient interest in sex;
(b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or
representation of sexual matters; and
18
(c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
But this test has never gained the support of more than three justices and
19
even Justice Brennan now concedes that the test is inadequate.
Important questions concerning substantive points of law which in
the abstract seemed to be answered by the proposed tests became common
ground for disagreement and confusion. The court was unable to maintain
a consistent approach to obscenity when confronted with issues involving
whether a national rather than a local community standard should
be applied; 20 whether pandering alone could cause a publication to be
termed obscene;21 or finally, whether the strong countervailing interest of
portecting a person's privacy within his home prevents the state from
22
telling him what books he may read or what films he may watch.
This inability of the Court to agree on some standard which could
provide the means to separate obscenity from sexually oriented but
constitutionally protected speech resulted in the practice of "per curiam"
reversals where a majority of five justices each applying his own standard

17 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
18 Id. at 418.

19 Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2659 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-94 (1966).
21 Ginzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). See Monaghn, Obscenity, 1966:
The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod, 76 YALE L.J. 127, 147

(1966).
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Many analysts and judges read Stanley to
mean that obscenity was to be elevated to a constitutionally protected level, and that
22

the only permissible purpose that might underlie regulatory legislation would be to

protect children and protect the privacy of adults who did not wish to receive it, see,

Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine Is Changing, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 185
(1969); Morreale, Obscenity: An Analysis and Statutory Proposal, 1969 Wis. L. REV.
421 (1969); Ratner, The Social Importance of Prurient Interest-Obscenity Regulation v. Thought Privacy, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 587 (1969); Note, Obscenity: A Return

to the First Amendment? 49 NEB. L. REv. 660 (1970); Comment, Stanley v. Georgia:

New Directions in Obscenity Regulations? 48 TEXAS L. REv. 646 (1970).
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reversed prior convictions for dissemination of obscene material. 25 In
effect this seems to be an endorsement of Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in Jacobellis where he admits that it is futile for him to define
what material he considers obscene but that "[he] knows it when [he] sees
''
it. 24 This reliance by the Court on some vague
standard to isolate and
totally surpress obscenity can only lead to a serious chilling effect on our
constitutionally protected first amendment rights. Even Chief Justice
Burger, the author of the majority opinion in Miller, admits that the
Court has failed in the past to provide an adequate standard. 25 The
question remains whether the Miller test is unique in this respect or
merely another attempt which will compound mistakes in the past
and seriously infringe upon protected freedoms in the future.
The California criminal obscenity statute in issue in Miller
incorporates the three-part test developed by Justice Brennan in
Memoirs.26 The Court rejects this test as being inadequate and seems to
rely on a reaffirmation of Roth as the source for its new standard. The
criticism directed at the decision in Memoirs is that it veered sharply
away from the Roth concept. Specifically, the Court attacks the
incorporation in the Memoirs test of the requirement that the material
be "utterly without redeeming social value." 27
Justice Burger distinguishes between the presumption in Roth that
obscenity is utterly without redeeming social value and the requirement
in Memoirs that to prove obscenity it must be affirmatively established
that the material is utterly without redeeming social value. Social
importance, according to Justice Burger's interpretation of Roth, is not
an independent test of obscenity but is relevant only in determining
the predominant prurient interest of material. 28 Therefore, the majority
of the Court formulated a new test of obscenity which affirms the
fundamental proposition of Roth, that obscenity is not protected by
the first amendment, but rejects the utterly without-redeeming-socialvalue test of Memoirs. This new test requires the trier of fact to adhere
to the following guidelines:

23

See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967). No fewer than 31 cases have been
decided in this fashion, see Justice Brennan's dissent in Paris Adult Theatre
v.
Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2647 (1973).

24 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
25 Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2612 (1973).
26 The test of CAL. PENAL CODE § 311, 311.2 (West 1970) is quoted
by the Court at

93 S.Ct. 2607, 2611 (1973).

27 Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2612-13 (1973), citing Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 388 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
28 Id. at 2613-14. Chief Justice Burger seems to adopt the reasoning of Justice Harlan
and Justice White concerning the social value test in Memoirs, see, e.g., Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 459, 461 (1966)

(Harlan, J., and White, J., dissenting).
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(a) Whether the average person applying contemporary community
standards would find the work taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest;
(b) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;
(c) Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value. 29
Except for the third criterion requiring the work taken as a whole to
have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value, the new standard
on its face, is similar to the Roth-Memoirs test. However, two additional
changes concerning the application of this new test clearly distinguish
it from past attempts by the Court to define obscenity. First, emphasis
was placed on the use of depictions of physical conduct in state obscenity
statutes to define what may be termed patently offensive.30 This would
enable the trier of fact to call upon concrete examples on which to
base his decision as well as provide adequate notice of what expressions
will be considered criminal.
Secondly, the Court rejects any attempt to apply a national
community standard in determining what may be considered prurient.
The majority of the Court concludes that this country is too large and
diverse to expect some abstract national standard to apply equally in all
cases. In practice, the Court points to continued use of a local community
3
standard, despite the requirements in Memoirs of a national standard. '
These changes are significant since they indicate a recognition by
the Court that a new approach is needed. However, instead of showing
an understanding of the difficulties inherent in the Roth approach, the
Court merely restates the Roth-Memoirs test while adding its own
influence to make the test more restrictive. The past has shown that
obscenity is a term of considerable vagueness. Continued attempts by the
Court over the last fifteen years to confine what is obscene to precise
definitive guidelines has failed. Obscenity statutes have not only failed to
give adequate notice of what conduct is obscene but their vagueness
allows censors to infringe upon constitutionally protected rights.3 2 The

Id. at 2615.
Id. at 2615, the Court suggested possible examples of what a state statute could
define for regulation under the second part of the new standard.
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts,

29

30

normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations of masturbation, excretory functions, and
lewd exhibitions of the genitals.
31 Id. at 2618.
32 The

due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that all criminal laws

provide fair notice of what the state commands or forbids, see, Lanzetta v. New

Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S.
385 (1926).
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changes incorporated in this test do not reduce this element of vagueness
but rather enhance the threat of suppression by the state of expression that
is constitutionally protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.
The rejection of the social value test is not a reaffirmation of the
reasoning in Roth as maintained by the majority of the Court, but rather
is itself a sharp break with the conceptual basis of Roth. The key element
which allows the Court in Roth to read obscenity out of the first
amendment is the lack of the slightest redeeming social value. In
attempting to draw the distinction between protected and unprotected
speech the Court in Roth states the following:
All ideas have even the slightest redeeming social importanceunorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the
prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guarantees, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited
area of more important interest. But implicit in the history of the
first amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without
33
social redeeming importance.
It is clear from the wording that the presence of social value must
save any material from being termed obscene.
To hold otherwise would result in a rejection of the traditional
principles that form the basis of the protection afforded under the first
amendment. The first amendment is viewed as a tool to achieve social
good by advancing knowledge and discovering truth. Knowledge can be
gained only by hearing all sides of an issue "even ideas hateful to the
prevailing climate of opinion."'3 4 To suppress these expressions would only
conceal the real problems that plague a changing society by diverting the
public's attention away from critical issues. The result is a stultification of
new ideas and thinking which in turn causes frustration in a society that is
forced to re-evaluate its attitudes because of changing circumstances.n
The new standard may be easier to prove but this does not lessen the
vagueness inherent in the wording. On the contrary, by limiting the first
amendment protection to expressions of serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value, the Court increases the danger of infringing upon protected expression simply by increasing the kinds of speech which may be
termed obscene. The final decision must still be a personal value judgment
of a majority of the Court which may vary from justice to justice.
The Court's use of physical depictions as examples to state legislators
of what can be termed patently offensive sexual conduct may provide an

33 Roth
34 Id.

v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).

3

5See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.

877, 878-887 (1963).
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element of definiteness and predictability but only at the risk of
extraordinary abuse. The Court is correct in assuming its traditional role
of final arbitrator between the people as a whole represented by their
36
legislators and the individual. However, in this capacity it is important
for the Court to maintain constant surveillance to assure regularity in
37
applying legislative-made law. A common fault of those statutes which
vagueness is their inherent permissiveness
for
down
have been struck
38
which allows the state great latitude in its operation. The result is an
erratic application of the law which is responsive only to the whims and
prejudices of those in authority. The Supreme Court has consistently
cases to provide a buffer zone around constitutionally
interfered in these
39
protected rights.
In the present case the incorporation of per se rules alone while
providing adequate notice fails to relate clearly to the particular obscene
subject matter intended to be prohibited. Supplemental tests will be
needed to prevent expressive works which may have social value from
being termed obscene merely because they depict the human body
engaging in certain sexual acts. Without these additional guidelines
the state can exercise its complete discretion in confiscating material
containing these physical depictions.
Even conceding the validity of the physical conduct test to pictorial
material, there remains the problem of distinguishing obscenity from
protected textual material. The Court fails to offer any guidance beyond
to
mere descriptive phrases. Hopefully this will not amount to a license
40
print.
in
conduct
sexual
describing
for
simply
confiscate material
Finally, the Court opens the door to widespread abuse by allowing
the trier of fact to apply a local community standard in deciding the
prurient and offensive nature of expression. While the Court may be
correct in criticizing past attempts to apply an abstract national standard
as unrealistic, the proposed alternative does not diminish the risk of

36 Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2618 (1973). This conception of the role of

the Supreme Court was shaped in its decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 303 (1816).
37 The place of the Supreme Court in our political structure has been the subject of
unending comment and controversy. For additional source material concerning various
approaches to this problem see Emerson, Toward a General Theory oj the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 905 n. 24 (1963).
38Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952) (per curiam); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451 (1939); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
39 Note, The Void-/or-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv.
67, 75, 81, 89 (1960).
40 Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2656 (1973). (Brennan, J., dissenting.)
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infringing upon protected expression.4 ' By not specifically defining what
is meant by a local community standard it may be feasible for a trier of
fact to draw upon a state, county, or municipal standard. This means that
a person's freedom to enjoy expression may be dependent upon the
particular geographical area of the country in which he lives. Ultimately,
the fear of criminal conviction could cause a chilling effect on material
in localities where it would not be considered obscene. 42 Therefore, the
public may be barred from access to material which the state could not
constitutionally suppress directly.
If one only considers the size and diversity of our country, the
adoption of a local community standard may seem appropriate. But
these facts must be balanced against the protection afforded the
individual by the first and fourteenth amendments. The Court attempts
to reconcile these two considerations by assuming that the trier of
fact, in drawing on a local community standard will be "guided always
by limiting instructions on the law."' 43 Unfortunately, the Court is
unable to provide limiting instructions of law to assure an overall
probability of definiteness and predictability.
Inevitably, the Court under both standards will have to resort to a
case-by-case analysis of the disputed material. This approach in turn
increases the chilling effect of an overbroad statute because of the
absence of determinative obscenity standards and the commitment to
a fact-oriented review." Besides the danger of self-censorship imposed
by the threat of criminal prosecution, the prospect of costly litigation is
a severe and persistent deterrent. Furthermore, the individual may be
unsure that this costly procedure of litigating his constitutional claim
will end in a reliable adjudication. Federal review of state judges
and juries is seriously hampered when the court is forced to apply
overbroad statutes to complex factual problems where an unilluminating
record may conceal prejudices and discrimination. The result is a
piecemeal approach that fails to provide a responsive judicial policy
which lessens the chilling effect of an overbroad statute. 45
The answer to what Justice Harlan calls "the intractable obscenity
problem" seems to be still in doubt. While the Court recognizes the need
41 See

Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524-525 (1970) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 434, 435
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Cam v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319 (1970) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
42
See Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 808

Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (1970)

(1969).

43 Miller v. California, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2618 (1973).
44

See Comment, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 H~Av. L. REv. 844,

865 (1970).

45 Id. at 868-71.
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for a change, it continues to treat obscenity as worthless unprotected
expression. Perhaps the answer is not in simply interpreting the Roth
decision to provide stricter standards but rather in re-evaluating the basic
premise of Roth which reads obscenity out of the first amendment.
Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton
decided the same day as Miller, suggests that the Court should abandon
its futile attempt to define obscenity and "probe the asserted state interest
in curtailing unprotected sexually oriented speech." 46 The emphasis
should not be placed on the worthlessness of such materials but on the
harm to social interests that obscene expression might induce. This
would mean that obscenity would be treated as protected expression
allowing constitutional standards to deal with the particular dangers
posed by obscenity. 47 Within this framework, draftsmen would be
able to focus upon tangible harms caused to governmental interests
by sexually oriented material and avoid the problems of overbroad
statutes. Some possible areas of legitimate state interest may be in
the protection of children 48 and unconsenting adults. 49
Proponents of this approach are the first to admit that difficult
questions remain unanswered. But the Constitutional framework upon
which it is based seems to provide the means to narrow and structure
the issues for decisions by the Court. The Miller Court, however, seems
to prefer to narrow the protection afforded by the Constitution.
STACY

E. WOLFE

4693 S. Ct. 2628, 2659 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47 It has been proposed that the basis for permissible state regulation of the harms
caused by obscenity is the familiar substantive due process standard detailed with new
precision, see Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine is Changing, 68 MICH.
L. REv. 185 (1969). Historic substantive due process requires the weighing of
competing interests against the constitutional interest in safeguarding protected rights,
so as to accommodate the necessities of security, peace, and order and preservation of
other rights without defeating the essential purposes of any constitutionally protected
right, see, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 502-25 (1934); Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884). Justice Douglas takes a narrower approach. He
insists that identical restraints on governmental suppression are imposed by the first

amendment upon the national government, and, by the incorporation of first amendment into the fourteenth amendment, upon the states. Until those restraints are
relaxed by constitutional amendment, he maintains, obscenity can be suppressed by
any level of government no more readily than any other expression that is not
demonstrably and sufficiently related to illegal action, Ginzberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 650-71 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
48 Ginzberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-43 (1968).
49 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1969).
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